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Abstract: There is probably no conceptualisation of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s 
claim that they are ‘trumps’. This seems to stand in stark contrast to the dominant, 
proportionality-based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, instead of trumping 
competing interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them. The goal of this article is to 
reconcile Dworkin’s work and proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our 
understanding of both. It offers a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights which 
does away with the misleading label of rights as ‘trumps’ and shows that, far from being in 
conflict with proportionality, properly understood Dworkin’s work supports and supplements 
that doctrine and provides a much-needed account of its moral foundation as being about human 
dignity, freedom, and equality. 
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There is probably no conceptualisation of rights more famous than Ronald 
Dworkin’s claim that they are ‘trumps’. Yet, this is puzzling in at least two ways. 
First, it is not at all clear what it means to say that rights are trumps; whatever the 
correct answer may be, it cannot mean that rights such as the right to private life, the 
right to property, or the right to an education – to name just a few rights that are 
widely recognised in contemporary rights discourse – always or at least normally 
‘trump’ all or most interests that clash with them. Second and related, by singling 
out their ‘trumping’ quality as their central, defining feature, Dworkin knowingly or 
unknowingly places his theory in sharp contrast to the dominant, proportionality-
based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, far from trumping 
conflicting interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them.  
The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s theory of rights and 
proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both.1 As 
will be shown, the strength of Dworkin’s theory lies in the substantive moral 
foundation that it offers – in particular its conceptions of human dignity, freedom, 
and equality –, but its weakness is the structural account of rights as ‘trumps’, as 
evidenced by the fact that despite its fame this idea has never really resonated in 
legal practice. With regard to proportionality, the opposite picture presents itself: 
the doctrine does not give any indication as to its moral foundation – which is 
illustrated by the fact that its most famous theoretical account, namely Robert 
Alexy’s theory of rights as principles and optimisation requirements, is a formal 
theory – while offering a structure that has proven to be so useful that it has become 
the globally dominant tool of rights adjudication. It will become clear that it is 
possible and indeed important to reconcile and combine the structural strength of 
proportionality with the substantive moral appeal of Dworkin’s theory. In order to 
do so, the essay first offers a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory which is 
faithful to his core commitments but departs from his narrative and terminology 
where necessary; in other words, the article aims, in truly Dworkinian spirit, to 
present his theory in its best light.2 This leads to the conclusion that labelling rights 
as trumps is misleading and fails to capture what is important about them under 
Dworkin’s own intellectual commitments (I.). The essay then demonstrates that 
interpreting proportionality in light of Dworkin’s theory leads to a richer conception 
                                                      
1 Jacob Weinrib (‘When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality’, forthcoming in Ratio 
Juris) also aims to reconcile Dworkin and proportionality, but he takes a route that is different from mine. 
While this essay focuses more on the values that guide Dworkin’s theory and, as will be shown, 
proportionality analysis (human dignity, equality, and freedom), Weinrib focuses on the structure that 
reasoning with rights has for Dworkin under his rights-as-trumps approach, and discovers in Dworkin’s 
discussions of specific rights issues a range of claims regarding the conditions under which a right can 
justifiably be limited that, as he demonstrates, resemble the various stages of the proportionality test as 
applied, in particular, by the Canadian Supreme Court. This shows that even Dworkin himself was not able 
to maintain his own structural claim that rights are trumps without a considerable number of qualifications 
which bring its structure closer to proportionality; this weakens the plausibility of his claim that their nature 
as trumps is a general structural feature of rights.  
2 On the nature of interpretation in general and the necessity to present the materials that are interpreted 
in their best light see Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, 1986), ch. 2.  
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of the doctrine (II.). Finally, it shows that Dworkin’s theory properly understood 
provides us with a much-needed moral foundation of proportionality as based on 
his original and important conceptions of human dignity, freedom, and equality 
(III.); the paper thus makes the case for the continuing relevance of Dworkin’s 
theory of rights in the current ‘age of proportionality’3. 
 
 
 
I. DWORKIN’S THEORY OF RIGHTS 
 
Dworkin’s theory of rights has evolved over the years and decades of his career.4 In 
this essay, I will work mostly with its last and, I believe, most appealing incarnation 
as presented in his books Is Democracy Possible Here?5 and Justice for Hedgehogs6. Readers 
who are familiar with Dworkin’s earlier writings may be surprised to find that many 
of the concepts and ideas that drove his earlier work are of little or no relevance in 
his last statement on rights. Generation after generation of jurisprudence students 
and scholars (including this author) have pored over ideas such as the distinction 
between external and internal preferences, utilitarianism as a background theory 
which necessitates the existence of rights, the famous right to equal concern and 
respect, and the principle-policy distinction. One can still find traces of them in 
Dworkin’s late work; however, they do not any longer occupy a prominent place. 
In my view – which I just state but do not defend in this paper – his final account 
of rights is superior to the earlier ones in that it focuses squarely on the important 
issues relating to the foundational values of human dignity, liberty, and equality; it 
thus overcomes and leaves aside the unnecessary complications arising mainly as a 
consequence of the unfortunate yet historically understandable entanglement of 
rights and utilitarianism which in my judgment – and presumably Dworkin’s own, 
given that he revised the theory accordingly – no longer resonate today.  
As a preliminary matter, Dworkin makes a conceptual distinction between 
constitutional and political rights.7 Political rights are those (moral) rights which 
ought to be protected as (legal) constitutional rights. So what Dworkin calls 
‘political’ rights is what most constitutional theorists call ‘constitutional’ rights: not 
the specific rights of any particular constitution but rather those rights which a 
constitution ought to protect. With this clarification in mind, let us turn to 
Dworkin’s account of political rights.  
 
                                                      
3 This is a reference to the title of Alexander Aleinikoff’s influential article ‘Constitutional Law in the Age 
of Balancing’, 96 (1987) Yale Law Journal 943. 
4 For an instructive overview of the development of Dworkin’s thought see Paul Yowell, ‘A Critical 
Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’, 52 (2007) American Journal of Jurisprudence 93.  
5 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton University 
Press, 2008) (henceforth: Dworkin, IDPH).  
6 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) (henceforth: Dworkin, JH).  
7 Dworkin, IDPH, 30-1.  
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Most legitimate acts of any government involve trade-offs of different people’s 
interests; these acts benefit some citizens and disadvantage others in order to 
improve the community’s well-being on the whole ... But certain interests of 
particular people are so important that it would be wrong – morally wrong – 
for the community to sacrifice those interests just to secure an overall benefit. 
Political rights mark off and protect these particularly important interests. A 
political right, we may say, is a trump over the kind of trade-off argument that 
normally justifies political action.8 
 
As mentioned above, I am going to criticise the usefulness of the term ‘trumps’ 
when characterising rights. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see some appeal in the 
notion of rights as trumps based on the above statement. For example, the 
government might claim, rightly or wrongly, that closing down my communist 
newspaper would improve the community’s well-being on the whole (because, say, 
workers would find less support for communist ideas and would therefore not go 
on strike as often, which would benefit the economy and thus enable the community 
to provide better education and hospitals to its citizens). However, my right to 
freedom of the press would function as a trump over these benefits to the 
community’s well-being and I would therefore continue to be entitled to publish my 
newspaper.  
How can we identify which rights we have? Dworkin explains: 
 
Someone who claims a political right makes a very strong claim: that 
government cannot properly do what might be in the community’s overall best 
interests. He must show why the individual interests he cites are so important 
that they justify that strong claim. If we accept the two principles of human 
dignity that I described in the last chapter, we can look to those principles for 
that justification. We can insist that people have political rights to whatever 
protection is necessary to respect the equal importance of their lives and their 
sovereign responsibility to identify and create value in their own lives.9 
 
So we may say that for Dworkin, people have a right to be treated with dignity; it is 
the importance of human dignity that justifies the extraordinary moral force of 
rights, namely to block policies that might further the community’s overall best 
interests. Human dignity, for Dworkin, consists of two principles: the principle of 
intrinsic value (an equality principle) and the principle of personal responsibility (a 
liberty principle). The principle of intrinsic value ‘declares the intrinsic and equal 
importance of every human life’10: ‘each human life has a special kind of objective 
value. It has value as potentiality; once a human life has begun, it matters how it 
                                                      
8 Ibid., 31. 
9 Ibid., 32. 
10 Ibid., 37. 
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goes.’11. Among the clearest cases of violations of this principle, and therefore of 
rights, are discrimination and genocide12 because such acts rest on the belief that 
some human beings are worth less than others, or even worth nothing.  
The principle of personal responsibility ‘holds that each person has a special 
responsibility for realising the success of his own life, a responsibility that includes 
exercising his judgment about what kind of life would be successful for him.’13 
Forcing a person to adopt the state’s official religion or punishing homosexual 
behaviour as being against God’s or the majority’s will would usurp the individual 
person’s responsibility to realise the success of his own life and would therefore 
violate the second principle of human dignity.  
Dworkin’s account of human dignity, equality, and liberty adds something 
distinctive to the often-cited claim that ‘every person should be treated as free and 
equal’ by specifying that equality is best understood as being about the equal and 
objective importance of every life and that freedom is concerned with every person’s 
individual responsibility to identify value in his or her own life. As so often, the devil 
is in the detail: in cases that are less clear than the examples mentioned above, how 
can we establish whether a policy respects or violates dignity? Dworkin gives us 
some guidance. With regard to the principle of personal responsibility, Dworkin 
argues that it necessitates two limitations on the state. First, there are certain 
foundational decisions which people must be free to make, such as ‘choices in 
religion and in personal commitments of intimacy and to ethical, moral, and political 
ideals’.14 Second, a law must not rely on a motive which assumes the superiority of 
one ethical ideal over another.15 Dworkin uses the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ in an 
idiosyncratic sense: for him, ethics refers to the duties a person has towards him- or 
herself, whereas morality refers to the duties a person has to others.16 For example, 
murder is immoral because it violates a duty one has to others (in particular, the 
possible victims). By way of contrast, determining and living one’s life in line with 
one’s religious convictions is a duty people have to themselves. While it is acceptable 
for the state to force people to live in accordance with collective decisions of moral 
principle (for example, to refrain from murdering), its laws must remain neutral 
between competing ethical ideals. Thus, moralism17 and (deep) paternalism are 
unacceptable.18 Furthermore, even laws that are not coercive may violate the second 
                                                      
11 Ibid., 9.  
12 Ibid., 37.  
13 Ibid., 10.  
14 Dworkin, JH, 368-9. 
15 Ibid., 369.  
16 Dworkin, IDPH, 20-21.  
17 While ‘moralism’ is a term widely used and understood, in Dworkin’s terminology, it would be more 
accurate to speak of ‘ethicalism’: forcing people to live in line with the state’s or majority’s ethical 
convictions.  
18 Dworkin, IDPH, 37-8, 73-4. (Impermissible) deep paternalism (where the state imposes its own 
preferred set of ethical values on a person in order to improve that person’s life) has to be distinguished 
from (permissible) superficial paternalism (which aims to help people achieve what they actually want) 
which is found, for example, in seat-belt laws.  
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principle: for example, a display of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms would 
violate the requirement of state neutrality in questions of ethics.  
Dworkin is less clear about which rights can be derived from the first principle 
of human dignity. He states that due process (fair trial) rights flow from it19 and 
says, more specifically, that treating every person’s life as objectively and equally 
important requires refraining from inflicting the special and great harm of 
punishment on him unless his guilt is proven.20 Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
the right not to be discriminated against obviously flows from the principle of equal 
importance.21 Most of Dworkin’s writing on equality is about distributive justice, 
and he has developed a theory – equality of resources – that is intended to help us 
structure an argument about which distribution of resources is fair.22 But it is unclear 
to what extent he believed that this is a matter of rights. Given that, for him, people 
have a right to be treated with dignity, and given that the first principle of dignity 
requires certain kinds of resource distribution, it would seem to follow that people 
ought to have constitutional rights to either a fair or at least non-arbitrary 
distribution of resources. However, to my knowledge, Dworkin has never made 
such a claim (possibly because his writing on constitutional rights is mostly 
concerned with U.S. constitutional law and he may have thought that such a view, 
however appealing as a matter of political morality, did not ‘fit’ well enough with 
U.S. constitutional history to qualify as the legally right answer).  
It is remarkable that Dworkin’s writing on rights oscillates between high level 
abstraction – in particular his account of the two principles of human dignity – and 
specific application – such as his well-known defence of abortion rights,23 or his 
writing on the importance of a strong protection of free speech.24 There is little in 
his scholarship relating to the room between high abstraction and concrete 
application, and it is possible that he thought that the best way to reason about 
questions of rights is to apply the abstract principles directly, without any 
intermediation, to any given specific problem. It is not my concern here whether or 
not this is adequate, but this starkly contrasts with accounts of rights that place 
proportionality front and centre because proportionality and related doctrines are 
located precisely in that middle space between foundational principles and concrete 
application. As far as I can see, the only structural point that Dworkin makes about 
rights is, precisely, that they function as ‘trumps’ over the community’s well-being. 
But while we were able to see the intuitive appeal of that statement, if we look at it 
again in light of a more nuanced understanding of his theory, the claim turns out to 
be misleading and unhelpful.  
                                                      
19 Dworkin, JH, 371-2.  
20 Ibid., 372.  
21 See n 12 and accompanying text.  
22 Dworkin, JH, 356-363. 
23 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 1-4; Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An 
Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (Knopf, 1993).  
24 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (above n 23), ch. 7-10.  
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It has some appeal in the case of the above-mentioned foundational decisions 
whose protection flows from the principle of personal responsibility. For example, 
we may say that the state must not prohibit the foundational decision of whether or 
not to have an abortion even if by doing so, it could enhance population growth 
and therefore greatly further the community’s well-being; in this sense the right to 
abortion functions as a trump. But in the other categories that Dworkin mentions, 
talk of rights as trumping the community’s well-being is problematic. Let us first 
consider the prohibition of (deep) paternalism (which flows from the second 
principle of human dignity). Paternalism is motivated by the desire to improve the 
agent’s life; for example, a prohibition of sodomy might be motivated by the desire 
to lead gay people to lead less sinful lives. But it is unhelpful to frame such a policy 
as being about the community’s well-being (which rights can then trump): paternalism 
makes a claim to improve the affected person’s well-being; it is not necessarily 
concerned with any effects on the community. Second, with regard to rights flowing 
from the first principle of dignity, again, it is not obvious why these rights should 
be seen as trumping the community’s well-being. For example, it might be the case 
that dignity requires the right to a free education for all. Of course, someone who 
disputes this could try to argue that the community’s well-being would suffer under 
such a policy (to which Dworkin could then respond that the right to education 
trumps any such concerns). But an argument against free education need not be 
about the community’s well-being; it could be, for example, about justice, claiming 
that collecting the resources needed to fund education would for some reason be 
unjust towards the rich.  
So I think that it is unfortunate under Dworkin’s own commitments to create 
an opposition between rights and the community’s well-being. We might consider 
fixing this problem by regarding rights as trumping not only the community’s well-
being but any value or consideration that conflicts with them: justice, well-being, 
utility, and so on. This, however, would amount to saying that rights must prevail 
over a policy that is justified on some other ground and would, in other words, 
simply point to the largely uncontroversial fact that policies need to comply with 
rights in order to be legitimate.  
To conclude, I do not think that the claim that rights are trumps is fortunate. 
It had its role to play in the earlier versions of Dworkin’s theory25 but does not point 
to an important or insightful feature of rights in his later work; it should therefore 
be dropped. While less catchy, Dworkin should have claimed instead that the 
foundational right that people have is to be treated with dignity, and that this 
requires, first, that every policy respect the equal and objective importance of their 
lives and, second, that every policy recognise everyone’s personal responsibility for 
realising the value of his or her life.  
 
                                                      
25 In his earlier work, he assumed – in line with the prevailing moral discourse at the time – that policies 
were usually justified on utilitarian grounds; rights came in to correct the occasionally impermissible 
aggregation of preferences that utilitarianism proposes. In that framework it made sense to say that rights 
trump utilitarian justifications.  
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II. PROPORTIONALITY AND DWORKIN’S THEORY OF RIGHTS 
 
Proportionality-based judicial review usually employs a two-stage analysis in order 
to answer the question of whether a given policy violates rights. The first question 
is whether the policy under consideration interferes with (limits, restricts) a right. 
The second is whether the interference is justified, and usually this is the case if it is 
proportionate. The first stage is of little practical relevance because of the 
phenomenon that George Letsas has called ‘rights inflation’:26 the scope of (prima 
facie) rights has become so broad in legal practice that it is difficult to find a case 
where the reviewing court concluded that the policy at stake did not interfere with 
a right and therefore was not in need of a justification. The consequence of this is 
that most if not all of the analytical work takes place at the second stage, where the 
test is proportionality.27 Proportionality has four steps.28 First, the policy that 
interferes with the right must pursue a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage). Second, it 
must be a suitable means of achieving the goal at least to some extent; put 
differently, there must be a rational connection between the policy and the goal 
(suitability or rational connection). Third, there must not be a less restrictive and equally 
effective alternative (necessity; least restrictive means). Fourth and finally, the burden 
imposed on the right-holder must not be disproportionate; establishing this requires 
balancing the seriousness of the interference with the right against the importance 
of the competing interests (proportionality in the strict sense; balancing).  
On a superficial analysis, it seems clear that proportionality, by regarding rights 
as balancing requirements, stands in stark contrast to a conception of rights that 
regards them as trumps.29 But I have already shown in the previous section that 
                                                      
26 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 126. 
27 This has led Webber to claim that ‘the entire constitutional rights-project could be simplified by 
replacing the catalogue of rights with a single proposition: The legislature shall comply with the principle 
of proportionality.’ (The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights [Cambridge University Press, 
2009], 4). 
28 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), 66; Mattias Kumm, 
‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights’, in Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal 
Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart, 2007), 131, 137; Kai Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, 10 
(2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 709, 711. There are variations as to the precise formulations 
of the test which are however not relevant here.  
29 It is remarkable that Dworkin seems to never have written about proportionality as a doctrine of 
constitutional law (maybe because it is not used in the U.S., which is the jurisdiction that he was most 
familiar with and wrote about regularly). In Is Democracy Possible Here? [above n 5, 48-9] there is a brief 
engagement with limitations clauses in the European Convention on Human Rights; Dworkin simply 
states that ‘[t]hese qualifications were the result of political compromises that served to reassure countries 
hesitating to embrace the convention’ – a statement that is rather simplistic and inadequate as a general 
account of limitation clauses; this is followed, in the next paragraph, by a claim to the effect that an 
abstract right needs to be refined before it can be considered absolute. I do not think that a lot of insight 
about proportionality and limitations clauses can be gained from these cursory claims; rather, their ad hoc 
nature indicates that Dworkin never took these concepts seriously.  
Dworkin did occasionally discuss the idea of balancing; but usually he had in mind balancing in the sense 
of a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation which he rejected as not doing justice to questions of rights, a 
point with which I agree: balancing in constitutional rights law is concerned with a conflict of interests 
which must be resolved through moral reasoning; thus, balancing refers not to utilitarianism but must be 
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Dworkin’s famous label does little to illuminate the structure of rights and that it is 
more adequate to summarise his theory as requiring that every person’s right to 
human dignity has to be protected, which means that every human life must be 
treated as having objective and equal importance and that every person’s sovereign 
responsibility for the success of his or her life must be respected. My argument in 
this section is that there is no conflict between his conception of rights properly 
understood and proportionality, and that, indeed, interpreting the four stages of the 
proportionality test in line with the requirements of human dignity leads to a richer 
understanding of the test.  
 
1.  THE LEGITIMATE GOAL STAGE 
 
At the first stage of the test, the legitimacy of the goal pursued by the policy in 
question must be assessed. The abstract formulation of the proportionality test does 
not give any guidance as to what makes a goal legitimate or illegitimate; it is therefore 
necessary to interpret it in line with an attractive conception of rights. On the 
assumption that Dworkin’s theory provides such a conception, it can directly be 
applied here. As explained above, Dworkin claims that a law must not rely on a 
motive which assumes the superiority of one ethical ideal over another; this makes 
moralism and (deep) paternalism impermissible. Thus, a goal is illegitimate if it 
assumes the superiority of one ethical ideal over another.30 The textbook example 
of such a goal would be a law that prohibits homosexual sex on the grounds that 
such sex is ethically worthless, against God’s will, or harmful to the person engaging 
in it. Similarly, it would be impermissible to cite as the goal of a policy banning 
headscarves in public universities the view that an Islamic lifestyle in general, or a 
particular interpretation of Islam which makes the headscarf necessary, is ethically 
unappealing and should therefore be prohibited or discouraged.  
Of course, most cases are not as clear-cut as the examples I have just given; 
this raises the question of whether Dworkin’s principle of personal responsibility is 
useful for the resolution of more complex cases as well. I think that it is, and will 
use the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Stübing v. Germany,31 which 
concerns incest, as an illustration. While incest is an activity which many people will 
ethically disapprove of quite strongly, it is not obvious whether its prohibition can 
be justified, given that the moralistic or paternalistic goal of stopping people from 
living ethically worthless lives does not qualify as legitimate under Dworkin’s 
principle of personal responsibility. The fact that Germany did not even try to rely 
on this reason is an indicator of the appeal of Dworkin’s principle: banning an 
activity because of ethical disapproval would widely be seen as simply unacceptable 
                                                      
used in the sense of ‘balancing as reasoning’ (see below n 36 and accompanying text). See, for example, 
his ‘It is absurd to calculate human rights according to a cost-benefit analysis’, an opinion piece in the 
British Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/24/comment. 
politics (last accessed 24 April 2017).  
30 A parallel point was first made by Kumm (above n 28), 142-8. See also my discussion of the legitimacy 
of goals in Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012), 183-93.  
31 Stübing v. Germany, (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 24.  
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and an unjustifiable intrusion into the personal life of the right-holder. The problem, 
however, is that even though the state may not openly rely on ethical disapproval, 
the motives that it cites instead may still violate the principle of personal 
responsibility for the following reasons. First, the goal, while not moralistic or 
paternalistic, may nevertheless and on closer inspection turn out to violate the 
principle of personal responsibility for other reasons; and second, the goal cited may 
serve as a pretext for a moralistic or paternalistic goal.  
Stübing is an example in point. In the case, Germany had argued that its ban on 
incest was justified because it pursued the goals of, first, protecting the family (the 
risk being an ‘inversion of social roles’ within the family structure); second, the 
protection of the weaker partner in a relationship (the risk being a structural 
imbalance which posed a threat to the weaker partner’s general and/or sexual self-
determination); third, preventing genetic damage to children; and fourth, 
maintaining a societal taboo against incest.32 The assumed need to maintain a 
societal taboo against incest is an instance of a goal that, while not openly moralistic 
or paternalistic, still (arguably) violates the second principle of dignity: a societal 
taboo against a particular behaviour means, broadly, that the respective behaviour 
(in this case, incest) is not seriously considered as part of the menu of options 
available to a person; a coercive measure designed to maintain an existing taboo can 
therefore be considered as an indirect form of thought control which, in turn, can 
be seen as violating the principle of personal responsibility by denying the individual 
the ability to reach his own judgment about the value of a particular activity.  
The goal of preventing genetic damage to children can be seen as an example 
of a goal which is (arguably) legitimate but serves as a pretext for an illegitimate goal. 
As a preliminary point, it is not clear that the goal should be considered legitimate 
because it is arguable that it is better for children with a genetic defect to be alive 
than not to be alive at all. But assuming that the goal is indeed legitimate, the 
possibility exists that it serves as a pretext for the moralistic motives of the state 
because in other contexts, the risk of genetic damage to the child is never considered 
to be a valid reason to prohibit sex and/or procreation;33 for example, it is 
uncontroversial that disabled people have the right to procreate even if their 
children are likely to be disabled, too.  
Structurally, there are two ways of dealing with this problem. The first is to 
focus on the subjective motivation of the law-makers and inquire into their true motives. 
This, however, creates unanswerable questions because those motivations will often 
not be accessible; it also sets unfortunate incentives for lawmakers to hide and 
possibly lie about their true motives. The second and preferable way is to focus on 
the objective justifiability of the policy. Thus, in the Stübing example, preventing genetic 
damage to children would be considered to be a legitimate goal; however, the 
                                                      
32 Ibid., paras 46-50.  
33 This argument was made by the applicant; see ibid., para 36.  
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relevance of the fact that other forms of procreation leading to children with genetic 
damage are not prohibited would be considered at a later stage of the test.34  
The above remarks are not meant as a comprehensive discussion of the 
intricacies of Stübing; rather, their point is to show how Dworkin’s second principle 
of human dignity can successfully be integrated into the interpretation and 
application of the proportionality test and enrich the proportionality analysis.  
 
2. THE BALANCING STAGE 
 
If a policy passes the legitimate goal stage, the next stages of the proportionality 
assessment concern its suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense. 
For reasons of explication of my argument, this section will focus on the balancing 
stage. It is the final and, usually, decisive stage of the proportionality analysis and 
requires a balancing exercise between the right-holder’s interests and the competing 
public or individual interests; the overall question is whether the policy places a 
burden on the right-holder that is disproportionate, that is, more than he or she can 
legitimately be expected to bear.  
One of the issues pointed out by authors who are critical of balancing relates 
to the lack of clarity as to what the concept means in constitutional rights law.35 It 
seems obvious that properly understood it neither points to a mechanical exercise 
of quantification and comparison nor a utilitarian or consequentialist kind of 
reasoning; neither form of balancing would do justice to questions of rights.36 
Rather, the starting point for any theory of balancing must be that balancing simply 
refers to the need to make a moral argument as to which of the two (or more) 
competing interests takes priority in a given case.37 This interpretation is preferable 
not only from a moral perspective; it is also compatible with the semantic meaning 
of the term: for example, when we speak of the need to find a ‘balanced’ solution 
to a moral problem, this means that we are looking for a solution which attaches 
the correct weight to all relevant considerations and is therefore morally defensible. 
But if balancing simply refers to the need to construct a moral argument about the 
competing values, which value or values should guide it? 
I wish to suggest that Dworkin’s principles of human dignity can be interpreted 
to provide us with a theoretical starting point if not a comprehensive theory of 
balancing. In a nutshell, I will argue that the balancing stage of the proportionality 
test is concerned with ensuring that the policy at stake respects the equal importance 
                                                      
34 This question could be considered at the balancing stage or arguably at a separate stage assessing the 
coherence of the policy. I have argued in favour of adding a coherence stage to the proportionality 
assessment in Möller (above n 30), 125-6. 
35 Grégoire Webber (above n 27), 88-9; Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An assault on human 
rights?’, (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 468; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press, 1998), 259. 
36 George Letsas, ‘Rescuing Proportionality’, in Cruft, Liao, and Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015), 316, 325-6. See also above n 29.  
37 Möller (above n 28), 720-1; Möller (above n 30), 140. 
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of the right-holder’s life. Thus, balancing is shorthand for assessing the compliance 
of a policy with the first principle of human dignity.  
This can be explained in the following way. To say that we have to ‘balance’ 
the burden on the right-holder against the importance of the competing right or 
public interest refers to the imperative of designing policies in a way that is 
‘balanced’ – that is, that distributes burdens and benefits in a way that is compatible 
with the principle of equality. Conversely, to say that a policy is disproportionate (in 
the strict sense) means that the state has attached too little weight to the interests of 
the right-holder: if it had attached the correct weight, it would have noticed that the 
burden on him or her was too high and therefore disproportionate. But to attach 
too little weight to someone’s interests means to fail to treat his interests as equally 
important as everyone else’s interests, and therefore fails to acknowledge the equal 
importance of his or her life.  
Let me give as an example the recent case of S.A.S. v. France,38 where the 
European Court of Human Rights decided that the French ban on the full-face veil 
was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The goal pursued 
by the ban, which the Court found to be legitimate, was the protection of ‘the 
ground rules of social communication’ and the conditions of ‘living together’.39 One 
of the issues at stake was whether a ban on the full-face veil was a disproportionate 
burden on those women wishing to conceal their faces for religious reasons. If we 
assume (with the dissent) that it was, then we are saying that France asked for ‘too 
much’ from the affected women and that, correspondingly, it attached too little 
weight to the legitimate interests of those women. Thus, it failed to treat them as 
someone whose lives have an importance that is equal to everyone else’s.  
Admittedly there is little direct support in Dworkin’s writing for my claim that 
the first principle of dignity requires what constitutional rights lawyers usually refer 
to as balancing. Most of his writing about specific rights issues is about the second 
principle of dignity: think of his well-known defences of abortion, hate speech, or 
euthanasia. When he writes about the first principle, he is mostly concerned not 
with rights but with theories of distributive justice (in particular, taxation).40 
However, there is no reason why the first principle should be entirely or even 
predominantly about fair taxation, and Dworkin himself certainly did not intend it 
to be; for example, he claims in Justice for Hedgehogs that the right to due process flows 
from the principle of equal importance,41 and he states in Is Democracy Possible Here? 
that certain forms of torture, discrimination, and genocide violate the first 
principle.42 As mentioned before, my goal in this article is not to engage in Dworkin 
exegesis, but rather to reconstruct his theory in a way that is coherent and shows it 
in its best light. To regard the reach of the first principle of dignity as restricted to 
                                                      
38 S.A.S. v. France, (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 11. 
39 Ibid, paras 121-2.  
40 See above n 19 - 22 and accompanying text.  
41 Dworkin, JH, 371-2. 
42 Dworkin, IDPH, 37. 
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questions of resource distribution and/or blatant denials of equal worth strikes me 
as arbitrary. Therefore, it is not only possible but indeed necessary to hold that the 
principle of equal and objective value demands a proportionate, ‘balanced’ 
distribution of burdens and benefits; and this is precisely what under proportionality 
is assessed at the balancing stage.  
In a slightly different context, Letsas has considered an argument which points 
to an important objection to my approach here. He writes about the famous Hatton 
case,43 which was about a policy allowing night flights at Heathrow airport which 
affected the sleep of some of the residents in the area. Letsas is critical of protecting 
the interest in good sleep as part of Article 8 ECHR and balancing it against the 
competing interest in economic development. He accepts that the interest in good 
sleep is an important interest and that justice and equality (for our purposes: 
Dworkin’s first principle of human dignity) might have something to say about its 
adequate protection. But:  
 
Perhaps the Heathrow night flights scheme did not allocate the various 
resources in play (sleep, economic benefits, employment) in a way that treats 
people as equals under some egalitarian theory of distribution. Perhaps the 
applicants have a solid claim based on distributive justice to request the 
government to restrict or abolish night flights, relocate the airport, or 
compensate the residents. But these are not matters falling within the law of 
human rights. We cannot inflate the concept of human rights so much that it 
covers the whole realm of justice. Human rights would then lose their 
distinctive moral force.44 
 
Applied to the issue that is my concern at this point, the problem can be presented 
in the following way. If we accept, with Dworkin, that (1) rights are about dignity, 
(2) dignity is, among other things, about treating people’s lives as equally important, 
and (3) this means that burdens and benefits must be distributed in a just way, then 
it would seem to follow that the scope of rights becomes so broad as to cover the 
whole domain of justice. This would be problematic because it is widely and, to my 
mind, correctly accepted that not every policy which is unjust also violates rights.  
I believe that there is indeed a structural weakness in Dworkin’s writing about 
rights and human dignity because he does not address, let alone resolve, this 
important point; as mentioned above, as far as I can see, he does not make any 
systematic attempt to work out a theory of the relationship between the first 
principle of human dignity and the scope of rights. However, the correct answer to 
this problem is not to radically ban all considerations relating to balancing from the 
scope of rights, as Letsas seems to suggest.45 Rather, another and more appealing 
                                                      
43 Hatton v. U.K., (2003) 37 EHRR 28.  
44 Letsas (above n 26), 129. 
45 Letsas concludes his chapter by stating: ‘If we want to be accurate we have to say that in cases 
like Hatton, states’ margin of appreciation is infinite and in cases like Dudgeon states have no margin of 
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solution is to distinguish between justice and rights in a different way, namely by 
claiming that rights require only that a policy be based on a reasonable, as opposed 
to the one correct, conception of justice, and that therefore, a distribution of 
burdens and benefits is proportionate as long as it is reasonable.46 This approach 
finds considerable support in the case law of courts that rely on proportionality, 
which regularly make statements to the effect that their task is not to establish 
whether the legislature designed the best possible (or ‘just’) policy but rather only to 
review whether the burden on the right-holder is justifiable or reasonable.47  
 
3. THE SUITABILITY AND NECESSITY STAGES 
 
The suitability and necessity stages, too, can be explained as flowing from Dworkin’s 
first principle of dignity. Let us first consider the case of suitability. An unsuitable 
policy places a burden on the right-holder but does not contribute to the 
achievement of its goal. This can easily be shown to violate Dworkin’s first principle 
of human dignity because treating a person’s life as (equally) important surely 
requires abstaining from burdening him for no reason. A similar consideration 
applies in the case of necessity; an unnecessary policy burdens the right-holder to a 
greater extent than necessary because the legitimate goal could be achieved to the 
same extent through a less burdensome policy. Again, respect for human dignity 
requires choosing the less burdensome policy because placing an unnecessary 
burden on the right-holder fails to treat his life as (equally) important.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Dworkin’s theory of rights properly understood is compatible with proportionality, 
and furthermore, it illuminates the meaning and interpretation of the different stages 
of the test. One of the by-products of integrating Dworkin’s theory with 
proportionality is a challenge to conventional wisdom according to which there 
exists a contrast between liberty rights (such as the rights to life, freedom of religion, 
association, expression, and the right to private life) and equality rights (in particular, 
the right to non-discrimination). The previous sections have shown that reasoning 
with so-called liberty rights requires an appreciation of liberty as well as equality: the 
legitimate goal stage of the proportionality analysis is concerned with liberty in that 
it ensures that the personal responsibility of the right-holder is respected; the 
following three stages (suitability, necessity and balancing/proportionality in the 
strict sense), however, are, on the analysis presented in this paper, concerned with 
equality because a ‘balanced’ or proportionate policy distributes burdens and 
                                                      
appreciation whatsoever.’ (ibid., 130). I interpret this as meaning that any balance of interests would be 
acceptable in Hatton, which is just a different way of saying that no balancing should take place at all.  
46 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-
Based Proportionality Review’ 4 (2010) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141; Möller (above n 30), 117-123.  
47 Möller (above n 30), 200-204. 
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benefits in a way that respects every affected person’s equal importance; conversely, 
a disproportionate policy, by imposing a burden on the right-holder that is 
unsuitable, unnecessary or disproportionate, fails to treat the right-holder’s life as 
equally important.  
 
 
 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DWORKIN’S CONTRIBUTION IN THE 
AGE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
So far I have offered a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights, and I 
have shown that when viewed in its best light it is compatible with proportionality 
and can indeed inspire a richer and more appealing interpretation of the four stages 
of the test. This section will offer some additional reflections on the importance of 
Dworkin’s theory for the current debates about proportionality and rights.  
Proportionality has been immensely successful as a legal doctrine: it was invented 
not by scholars or theorists of rights but by judges,48 and it had become a globally 
successful tool of rights adjudication long before the first comprehensive theory of 
it was published.49 Thus, its success is primarily based on its practical usefulness for 
judges deciding cases about constitutional rights: it offers them a helpful structure 
by splitting up the question of whether a policy violates rights into four sub-
questions that can be analysed separately. This is no small achievement. But while 
the role of proportionality as a tool and a legal doctrine has certainly been extremely 
useful, for a long time there was no agreement on, in fact not even a conversation 
about, the values on which proportionality-based judicial review is based. The fact 
that the first major and most famous account of proportionality-based conceptions 
of constitutional rights, namely Robert Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights as 
principles and optimisation requirements, is a formal theory, that is, one which 
explicitly rejects the possibility of a substantive – value-based – theory of 
constitutional rights,50 underlines this feature of the proportionality discourse.  
In recent years a couple of substantive theories have been proposed. Mattias 
Kumm has argued that proportionality-based judicial review protects every person’s 
right to justification by instructing judges to engage in Socratic contestation in order 
to determine whether an act by a public authority is justifiable in terms of public 
reason.51 I have contributed to the debate by arguing that the point of constitutional 
rights is to ensure that any act which limits a person’s ability to live her life according 
to her self-conception is justifiable to her; that this justification is successful if the 
policy at stake rests on a reasonable specification of the spheres of autonomy of 
equal citizens; and that proportionality properly understood assesses precisely this 
                                                      
48 On the history of proportionality, see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing 
and Global Constitutionalism’, (47) 2008-9 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, sections III and IV.  
49 Namely Robert Alexy’s (above n 28). 
50 Ibid., 11. 
51 Kumm (above n 46).  
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question.52 We ought to add Dworkin’s conception of rights and dignity to these 
existing attempts to make sense of proportionality. The rough outline of a 
conception of constitutional rights that emerges from my reconstruction of his 
theory is the following. The foundational right that everyone has is to be treated 
with human dignity. Thus, any law or other act by a public authority must respect 
his equality (more precisely: the equal and objective importance of his life) and his 
freedom (his personal responsibility for the success of his life). The justification of 
the principle of proportionality, then, lies in its ability, if properly interpreted, to 
ensure the protection of human dignity and its two sub-principles. At the legitimate 
goal stage, any justifications that are incompatible with the value of personal 
responsibility are discounted. The following three stages (suitability, necessity and 
balancing) assess whether the policy distributes burdens and benefits in a way that 
can reasonably be regarded as compatible with the person’s equal importance. 
The existing theories of the point and purpose of constitutional rights are not 
mutually exclusive and not even necessarily in competition with each other; rather, 
they highlight different facets of the values underlying constitutional rights. Kumm’s 
emphasis is on the fact that all state action must, as a matter of rights, be justifiable 
in terms of public reason; thus, his focus is on the structural and institutional 
conditions of legitimate authority; and while he believes that a conception of public 
reason as well as a more fully worked-out account of the right to justification will 
have to say something about freedom and equality, he does not provide a 
conception of these values. In my previous work, I have attempted to spell out more 
concretely the meaning of equality and, in particular, autonomy as structural building 
blocks of a theory of rights, but I have stopped short of providing a moral grounding 
of those values. Dworkin’s emphasis, by way of contrast, is directly on the 
substantive values that ground rights and legitimacy, that is, the two dimensions of 
human dignity. Furthermore, there are links between the right to justification (that 
grounds rights in Kumm’s and my accounts) and human dignity (which grounds 
rights for Dworkin): Rainer Forst (who first proposed the idea of a right to 
justification as the basis of human rights) has claimed that human dignity implies 
first and foremost that every person be treated as possessing a right to justification.53  
Thus, Dworkin’s theory of rights should not be sidelined as one that is in 
competition with proportionality and therefore, at least for the time being, on the 
losing side of history and of limited interest and relevance. Rather, his insights 
should be integrated with the currently dominant, proportionality-oriented 
discourse about rights. The importance and relevance of his work lies in its ability 
to, first, guide the interpretation of the different stages of the proportionality test 
and, second, provide a distinctive account of the moral foundation of 
                                                      
52 Möller (above n 30), passim. 
53 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive 
Approach’, 120 (2010) Ethics 711, 717.  
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proportionality-based approaches to rights as being about human dignity, liberty, 
and equality.  
 
